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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-4324 
____________ 
 
AMERICO BERROA, 
    Petitioner, 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
        Respondent 
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A044-877-886) 
Immigration Judge: Margaret R. Reichenberg 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 3, 2013 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, JORDAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 14, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
Petitioner Americo Berroa (“Berroa”) petitions for review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ final order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny 
the petition for review. 
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Berroa, a native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, was admitted to the 
United States as a lawful permanent resident in November, 1994.  On September 17, 
1999, he was convicted following a guilty plea in New York state court, Bronx County, 
of attempted criminal sale of crack cocaine in the third degree in violation of N.Y. Penal 
Law § 110 (attempt) and § 220.39(1), a class B felony.  On July 11, 2002, Berroa was 
convicted of another offense, criminal possession of crack cocaine in violation of N.Y. 
Penal Law § 220.03.  On January 10, 2012, the Department of Homeland Security 
initiated removal proceedings, charging that Berroa was removable under Immigration & 
Nationality Act (“INA”) § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), on the basis of 
an aggravated felony as defined by INA § 101(a)(43)(B) (drug trafficking crime), and (U) 
(conspiracy or attempt), for the 1999 felony attempted criminal sale conviction.  The 
NTA also charged that Berroa was removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(B)(i), for the 2002 possession conviction, in that after admission he was 
convicted of violating a law relating to a controlled substance.  In this appeal we are 
concerned with the 1999 felony attempted criminal sale of crack cocaine conviction 
because cancellation of removal requires the alien to establish, among other things, that 
he has not been convicted of an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C). 
Early in the removal proceedings, the Government submitted Berroa’s state 
conviction records, which included one item pertaining to his 1999 attempted criminal 
sale conviction.  That item, titled “Certificate of Disposition – Superior Court 
Information,” stated that, on August 9, 1999, Berroa pleaded guilty to “Attempted 
Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance 3rd Degree PL  110-220.39  01 CF (Crack).”  
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A.R.  203.  It further noted that Berroa was sentenced on September 17, 1999 to time 
served and 5 years of probation.  See id. 
Berroa appeared with counsel at a hearing on February 14, 2012, and argued that 
he was not an aggravated felon under the INA and that he needed “to obtain the plea 
allocution,” A.R. 127, relating to the 1999 attempted criminal sale conviction.  Counsel 
argued that Berroa met the “threshold” for cancellation of removal, and that he wanted 
court records “to find out exactly what [Berroa] pled to” and “the plea allocution will 
indicate that fact.”  See id. at 128.  Berroa also indicated his wish to pursue state post-
conviction relief with respect to the 1999 conviction on the basis of Padilla v. Kentucky, 
130 S. Ct. 1473 (U.S. 2010) (counsel renders constitutionally ineffective assistance when 
he fails to advise a defendant that his guilty plea makes him subject to automatic 
deportation).  The Immigration Judge granted Berroa a continuance, not so that he could 
seek post-conviction relief, but so that he could obtain additional documents pertaining to 
the factual basis for his 1999 guilty plea to attempted criminal sale of crack cocaine.  
A.R. 131.
1
 
Berroa again appeared with counsel at a March 1, 2012 hearing.  He did not 
submit additional conviction records relating to the 1999 conviction.  He admitted the 
factual allegations with respect to the 2002 possession conviction, A.R. 140, and then 
                                              
1
 The IJ stated: 
 
So, you, you’re going to have to face these charges, however much you and your 
client would not like to do that.  You’re going to have to answer them.  And, the 
Government’s made their argument.  They’ve provided records.  It’s time for you 
to come forward with evidence…. 
 
Id. 
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argued that he had since turned his life around by being a good worker and helping 
people.  With respect to the 1999 conviction, he acknowledged that he had pleaded guilty 
to attempted criminal sale in the third degree, but stated: “This was my first experience 
with the criminal justice system.  I was scared.  I was a drug user, not a seller.  I 
professed my innocence to the legal aid lawyer, but she told me that it would be better to 
take the deal. She never told me of the Immigration consequences back in 1999 of taking 
this deal.  And, honestly, I would have never pled guilty if I knew of these 
consequences.”  A.R. 140-41.  The Immigration Judge then expressed her view that the 
1999 attempted criminal sale conviction was an aggravated felony under the INA, and 
that Berroa was removable as charged, but another hearing was scheduled. 
Berroa submitted an application for relief under the Convention Against Torture, 
but then withdrew it and, instead, through new counsel at the hearing on June 8, 2012, 
asked for a continuance so that he could file a petition for post-conviction relief in New 
York state court on the basis of Padilla.  The IJ issued an oral decision on this same day, 
declining to grant any further continuances because she had already granted a 
continuance, Berroa had not yet even filed his motion for post-conviction relief, and, 
even if he had, the likelihood that he would be granted post-conviction relief was 
speculative.  The IJ further held that Berroa’s 1999 felony conviction for attempted 
criminal sale of crack cocaine was an aggravated felony under the INA, and that Berroa 
also was removable for his conviction for a controlled substance violation, the 2002 
possession conviction.  Because of his aggravated felony conviction, Berroa was 
ineligible for relief from removal, including voluntary departure and cancellation of 
removal.  The IJ ordered Berroa removed to the Dominican Republic. 
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Berroa appealed through his same counsel to the Board of Immigration Appeals, 
arguing that his 1999 felony conviction for attempted criminal sale was not an aggravated 
felony under Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47 (2006) (aggravated felony includes only 
conduct punishable as a felony under Controlled Substances Act, regardless of whether 
state law classifies such conduct as felony or misdemeanor), and a recent not precedential 
decision by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Davila v. Holder, 381 Fed. Appx. 413 (5th 
Cir. 2010).  Berroa also argued that the IJ abused her discretion in declining to grant a 
continuance on the basis of Padilla.
2
  The Department of Homeland Security did not 
submit a brief in response.  
On October 23, 2012, the Board dismissed Berroa’s appeal, affirming the IJ’s 
determination that he is removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony, 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), as defined by INA § 101(a)(43)(B) (drug trafficking crime), 
and (U) (conspiracy or attempt).  The Board employed the “formal” categorical approach, 
see Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), and hypothetical federal felony 
approach, see, e.g., Evanson v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 550 F.3d 284, 289 (3d Cir. 2008), and 
concluded that Berroa’s 1999 felony conviction for attempted criminal sale of crack 
cocaine under N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39(1) corresponded to the federal offense of 
attempted distribution of a controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, 
and was punishable as a felony under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(C).  Berroa thus was 
ineligible for cancellation of removal.  The Board determined that Lopez did not change 
this result, and, in the margin, the Board noted that Davila was neither precedential nor 
                                              
2
 Berroa did not appeal the IJ’s determination that he is removable as an alien convicted 
of a controlled substance violation. 
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controlling in this circuit.  The Board also affirmed the IJ’s denial of Berroa’s request for 
an additional continuance, reasoning that the IJ had reasonably refused to continue 
proceedings on the basis of an unfiled and speculative collateral attack on the 1999 
conviction. 
Berroa petitions for review pro se.  We generally have jurisdiction to review a 
final order of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), (b)(1), but where the petitioning alien 
has been convicted of an aggravated felony after admission to the United States, we 
review only legal and constitutional claims, see id. at § 1252(C)-(D).  Here, we have 
jurisdiction to address whether Berroa’s 1999 felony conviction for attempted criminal 
sale of crack cocaine in violation of New York Penal Law § 220.39(1) constitutes an 
aggravated felony under the INA, see id. at § 1252(a)(2)(D); Papageorgiou v. Gonzales, 
413 F.3d 356, 358 (3d Cir. 2005).  Whether Berroa’s 1999 felony conviction qualifies as 
an aggravated felony is a question of law subject to plenary review.  See Evanson, 550 
F.3d at 288; Garcia v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 462 F.3d 287, 290-91 (3d Cir. 2006). 
We will deny the petition for review.  Berroa argues in his pro se brief that the 
“modified” categorical approach should have been used to analyze whether his 1999 
felony conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony under the INA because the state 
statute is “facially disjunctive,” see Petitioner’s Brief, at 4-5, 11-16.  There are two routes 
to determine whether a conviction is an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 
as defined by INA § 101(a)(43)(B): (1) the illicit trafficking route and (2) the 
hypothetical federal felony route.  See Evanson, 550 F.3d at 288-89.  A state drug 
conviction constitutes an aggravated felony under the hypothetical federal felony route if, 
regardless of whether a state would classify it as a misdemeanor, it would be punishable 
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as a felony under the federal Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).  See Thomas v. Att’y 
Gen. of U.S., 625 F.3d 134, 137 (3d Cir. 2010).   
The Board concluded that Berroa’s conviction was an aggravated felony under the 
hypothetical federal felony route using the formal categorical approach described in 
Taylor, 495 U.S. 575.  Application of the formal categorical approach in Berroa’s case 
requires examination of N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39(1), without consideration of the 
particular facts underlying the conviction, to determine whether a violation of it is 
punishable as a felony under the CSA.  Garcia, 462 F.3d at 291.  Under § 220.39(1), “[a] 
person is guilty of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree when he 
knowingly and unlawfully sells a narcotic drug.”  N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39(1).  New 
York’s controlled substance statute defines “sell” to mean “sell, exchange, give or 
dispose of to another, or to offer or agree to do the same,”  N.Y. Penal Law § 220.00.  
Accordingly, the statute under which Berroa was convicted in 1999 applies to any 
transfer of crack cocaine, whether payment was involved or not.  See People v. Starling, 
650 N.E.2d 387, 390 (N.Y. 1995) (by enacting broad definition of “sell” to embrace acts 
of giving or disposing of drugs, Legislature evinced  clear intent to include any form of 
transfer of controlled substance from one person to another). 
In Davila, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the petitioning 
alien’s conviction for criminal sale of cocaine in the second degree under N.Y. Penal Law 
§ 220.41 constituted an aggravated felony because it was punishable under the CSA as a 
felony.  381 Fed. Appx. at 415.  Applying the formal categorical approach, the court 
looked at §§ 220.41 and 220.00, and compared these New York statutes to 21 U.S.C. § 
841(a)(1).  The court determined that the petitioning alien could have been convicted 
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under § 220.41 merely for an offer to sell cocaine, which the court reasoned was not an 
offense under the CSA.  Davila, 381 Fed. Appx. at 415.  Therefore, the court applied the 
“modified” categorical approach, see Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005), 
and concluded that the petitioning alien’s conviction records did not reveal anything 
about the nature of the “sale” because the indictment merely tracked the language of the 
statute.  The alien was thus eligible to apply for cancellation of removal.  But see Clarke 
v. Holder, 386 Fed. Appx. 501, 504 (5th Cir. 2010) (violation of N.Y Penal Law § 220.39 
may encompass conduct that does not qualify as a drug trafficking crime under CSA but 
conviction records were sufficient to establish that alien’s conviction was drug trafficking 
crime). 
As explained by the Board, we are not bound by an unpublished decision from 
another circuit.  Moreover, we agree with the Board that Berroa’s 1999 felony conviction 
for attempted criminal sale of crack cocaine under N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39(1) – using 
the formal categorical approach – corresponded to the federal offense of attempted 
distribution of a controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  Distribution within 
the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) does not require that a “sale” take place.  The word 
“distribute” means “to deliver,” id. at § 802(11), and “deliver” means “the actual, 
constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance,” id. at 802(8).  Under 
section 841(a)(1), remuneration is not required in order to satisfy the requirements of 
“delivery” or “distribution” of a controlled substance under section 841(a)(1).  See 
United States v. Wallace, 532 F.3d 126, 129 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Cormier, 
468 F.3d 63, 71 n.3 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Durham, 464 F.3d 976, 981 n.7 (9th 
Cir. 2006); United States v. Washington, 41 F.3d 917, 919-20 (4th Cir. 1994).  Therefore, 
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even if Berroa did no more than offer to sell crack cocaine and no money changed hands, 
the state offense would be conduct punishable as a federal felony under the CSA, thus 
rendering it an aggravated felony under the INA.  See Pascual v. Holder, 707 F.3d 403 
(2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (criticizing Davila  and, applying formal categorical 
approach, holding that federal statute analogous to N.Y. Penal Law § 220.39(1) is 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).   
Moreover, even if we applied the “modified” categorical approach here, see 
generally Thomas, 625 F.3d at 143 (applying modified categorical approach to analyzing 
New York misdemeanor conviction for criminal sale of marijuana), Berroa failed to 
adduce any records to support his assertion that he did not, in pleading guilty, admit the 
elements of the offense of attempted criminal sale of crack cocaine.  During the 
proceedings, he asked for and was granted a continuance to obtain records relating to his 
plea, and then failed to produce them, and he has not argued that the Government, in 
providing only the certificate of disposition relating to the 1999 attempted criminal sale 
conviction, failed to meet its burden of proof, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (Government 
must prove deportability by clear and convincing evidence), (B) (listing documents that 
constitute proof of criminal conviction).  
In reliance on Lopez, Berroa may be arguing that, in pleading guilty to attempted 
criminal sale of crack cocaine, he was guilty only of simple possession of cocaine, which 
is a misdemeanor under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a), see Petitioner’s Brief, at 16.  Lopez involved 
a petitioning alien’s felony conviction under a South Dakota possession statute for aiding 
and abetting the possession of cocaine.  The Supreme Court held that the alien’s 
conviction did not constitute an aggravated felony under the INA because it was 
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punishable only as a misdemeanor under 21 U.S.C. § 844(a).  We note that the CSA 
punishes drug possession offenses as misdemeanors, that is, by one year’s imprisonment 
or less, see 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a), except for repeat offenders, persons who possess more 
than 5 grams of cocaine base, persons who possess flunitrazepam, and persons who 
possess with intent to distribute.  Lopez, 549 U.S. at 54 n.4 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 844(a)).  
New York Penal Law § 220.39(1) is not, however, a drug possession statute.  We thus 
agree with the Board that Lopez does not require a different result in Berroa’s case. 
Last, Padilla is not retroactive to cases on collateral review and thus does not 
apply to Berroa’s 1999 conviction, Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (U.S. 2013).  
Accordingly, his argument that good cause required the IJ to grant him an additional 
continuance so that he could pursue state post-conviction relief under Padilla is moot.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
  
